Since Russia attacked Ukraine on February 24, we have been witnessing some important changes in not only European but also national foreign, security and defense policies.
In the past, Europeans often appeared reluctant to coordinate their national foreign, security and defense policies, rather preferring to “go it alone”. The Ukraine crisis, however, has elicited a strong, unified response from the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and their members as never before. To put pressure on the Kremlin and bring the war to an end as soon as possible, the EU, in close coordination with North American allies, has adopted unprecedented measures. In June, EU member states agreed on a sixth package of sanctions, which included an embargo on Russian oil imports (currently 90%) and the removal of three Russian banks – among them Sberbank – from the international SWIFT payment platform, something which was unthinkable only a few months ago.
In addition, the EU activated for the first time the European Peace Facility (EPF), a newly established off-budget fund that replaced, merged and expanded the scope of the Athena Mechanism and the African Peace Facility, and introduced the possibility for the EU to deliver lethal weapons to third countries. Through the EPF, the bloc has already provided €1.500 million in financial support to Ukraine’s military, with an additional €500 million announced on May 24. The next day, the European Commission adopted the second annual work program of the European Defence Fund (EDF), through which it has been scaling up funding for collaborative research in innovative defense products and technologies, and introduced some new tools to promote defense innovation under a new umbrella, the EU Defence Innovation Scheme (EUDIS). In accordance with the Versailles declaration, where EU leaders agreed on the need for more effective defense spending, this €2 billion-worth instrument will spur defense innovation while reducing industrial fragmentation (when possible) in coordination with NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) and the Innovation Fund launched at the Madrid Summit on June 30.
Furthermore, the raging war has reignited defense spending debates at the member state level, not only in the “Big Three” – Germany, France, and Italy – but also among non-NATO EU member states with a long tradition of neutrality such as Finland, Sweden, and even Ireland.
The public debates in Germany, France and Italy
In Germany, in addition to lifting restrictions on German weapons being sent to conflict zones by third parties and promising to arm Ukraine in a major foreign policy shift, Chancellor Olaf Scholz pledged to create a special €100 billion fund for military procurement and committed to spending 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense by 2024, in line with the Alliance goal. Mr. Scholz, however, has been heavily criticized both at home and abroad for his approach on Ukraine. According to the polls, while a majority (69%) of Germans seems to support boosting defense spending, public opinion is divided (45% in favor 55% against) over the supply of heavy weapons to aggressed Ukraine. The day after the Bundestag voted to provide heavy artillery to Kyiv on April 28, an open letter signed by twenty-eight German intellectuals advising Scholz against it gained support online. A week later another letter signed by twice as many German intellectuals called instead on Scholz to provide heavy weapons to Ukraine. Some, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy who recently dismissed the Ukrainian ambassador to Germany, have in fact criticized the German leader for the repeated delays and overall reluctance to send arms to Ukraine, to the point of calling into question Germany’s very leadership role in Europe. While a deal on the special fund was eventually reached by the “traffic-light” coalition government and conservative opposition parties in late May and approved by the Bundestag in early June, at the time of writing only Panzerhaubitze 2000 self-propelled howitzers have been delivered to Ukraine by Germany directly. The rest of the military aid announced by the German government – which shall include Gepard anti-aircraft vehicles, IRIS-T SLM anti-aircraft systems and MARS II multiple-launch rocket systems – in all likelihood will not reach Ukrainian soldiers until late summer or even early autumn.
In Italy, the political willingness of the executive branch to arm Ukraine has instead inflamed discussions over defense investments and increases to the country’s defense budget. On June 21, Italy’s Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio split with the Five-Star Movement and formed a new parliamentary group. The “casus belli” was precisely the party’s stance on supplying arms to Ukraine and overall insufficient support to NATO and EU decisions concerning Ukraine.
Earlier this spring, a heated debate among the populist party currently led by former Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte and the other political forces supporting the technocratic government led by ex-European Central Bank President Mario Draghi had taken place in Rome. Prime Minister Draghi appeared rather appalled – going as far as to inform Italian President Sergio Mattarella – by the remarks made by Conte, who argued against increasing the Italian defense budget at a time when the country is still grappling with the health crisis and socio-economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, the Boot will not hit the NATO 2% GDP target until 2028, lagging behind other NATO allies. However, unlike Germany, Italy has not shied away from sending heavy weapons, such as Stinger surface-to-air missiles and M2 Browning heavy machine guns, to aggressed Ukrainians. Despite the topic of arms supplies being classified information, Corriere della Sera reported that the third decree (a fourth is in the making) issued by the Italian government in May aimed to provide Ukraine with even heavier weaponry, including howitzers 155/39 FH-70 cannons. At the end of June, three Panzerhaubitze 2000 self-propelled howitzers, officially on their way to Germany for a joint military exercise, were stopped in Southern Italy for lacking the necessary authorizations. Given the secrecy that surrounds the country’s arms deliveries to Kyiv, it cannot be excluded that Ukraine was their final destination.
If in Germany and Italy the possibility to increase national defense budgets and the decision to support Ukraine militarily sparked controversy, in France we have not seen much of a debate, perhaps also thanks to the April reelection of President Emanuel Macron. France has in fact been adopting a proactive approach in relation to military spending for quite some time now. Last year, the country invested $56.6 billion on defense (around 1.9% of its GDP) and in March, even before securing his second term, Macron announced that the defense budget would be further raised in response to the ongoing war and reach the NATO 2% goal no later than 2025. The Minister of the Armed Forces Sébastien Lecornu recently confirmed a €3 billion military budget increase compared to last year, bringing the total for 2023 to €44 billion. In terms of arms deliveries, however, the Elysée has so far only sent Milan anti-tank missiles, Mistral anti-aircraft missiles, and Caesar self-propelled howitzers to Ukraine. Since his joint visit to Kyiv with Chancellor Scholz and Prime Minister Draghi, President Macron has been pledging additional Caesar howitzers and even asked the French arm manufacturer Nexter to increase their production, perhaps to diffuse the tension over his comments about the need to avoid “humiliating” Russia in Ukraine.
Although Macron’s centrist alliance recently suffered a severe blow, in France the president enjoys quite some freedom when it comes to foreign and defense policy matters. Therefore, it is very unlikely that France’s position on these issues will be affected by the results of the legislative elections.
And in Finland, Sweden, and Ireland
Meanwhile in Northern Europe, Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin and Swedish Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson made history. Breaking with longstanding policies of not supplying arms to war zones, the two Nordic countries were the first to announce that they would provide weapons to Ukraine. Since the war started, Sweden has provided 10.000 anti-tank weapons (5.000 in February and another 5.000 in March) and other military equipment (helmets, body armors, rifles, etc…), of which more deliveries were announced at the end of June. Likewise, in early May Finland announced its third shipment of weapons to Ukraine, although details regarding the content of this as well as previous shipments have not been disclosed. Moreover, on May 18, despite Mr. Putin’s threats, the two female leaders formally reversed decades of neutral foreign and security policies by formally applying for NATO membership. The move has been backed by the majority of Finns and Swedes, as has the significant increase in defense spending that will allow both countries not only to reach but, in the case of Finland, even exceed the NATO 2% GDP goal. Following the signing of a trilateral memorandum with Turkey, who had initially objected to Finland and Sweden joining NATO, at the NATO Summit in Madrid all thirty NATO members signed the Accession Protocols for the two countries. The ratification process, howerer, is still ongoing and might take up to a year to conclude (so far, of the abovementioned countries only Germany has ratified the two Scandinavian countries’ NATO membership; the document is still pending ratification by Italy and France). Meanwhile, Finland and Sweden can participate in NATO meetings and possibly benefit from greater intelligence sharing, however they are not protected by the Article 5 guarantee. This might explain why Finland recently passed a law that would allow it to build barriers on its border with Russia. There is in fact a very high risk that the Kremlin might engage in hybrid tactics over the country’s NATO bid.
Even Ireland, a neutral island with no proximity to the Russian Federation whatsoever, is doubling its relatively low military spending (it currently invests only 0,3% of its GDP on defense) in response to the war in Ukraine. Although, unlike Finland and Sweden, Ireland is not sending military supplies to Ukraine and does not plan on joining NATO “any time soon”, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine is changing the debate in the country, forcing the Irish Republic to rethink its security and defense policy. In March, the three coalition government parties – Fine Gael, Fianna Fáil and the Green Party – all voted against a bill calling for a referendum on writing neutrality into Ireland’s Constitution.
Taoiseach Micheál Martin, who recently met with Zelenskyy in Kyiv reiterating his support for Ukraine’s EU membership and Russia sanctions, and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Defence Simon Coveney believe in fact that the concept of neutrality should “evolve” and “be redefined”. The Emerald Isle might not be vulnerable to conventional military attacks, but it is extremely vulnerable to cyber threats and attacks. As pointed out by the leader of the Fianna Fáil delegation in the European Parliament Barry Andrews,“75% of transatlantic underwater internet cables flow through or near Ireland’s exclusive economic zone” and Dublin hosts the European headquarters of big-tech giants of the likes of Google and Facebook. This is probably what led the country to join the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence in 2019, despite not being a member of NATO (only a Partnership for Peace member), and to participate in EU Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects dealing with cyber and maritime security. An even more active participation is to be expected in the near future.
An Important Opportunity
In conclusion, it is our belief that the war in Ukraine represents an important opportunity for Europe to strengthen its common security and address defense capability shortfalls. A new security architecture is emerging from this crisis and one in which the EU and NATO should seek not simply to complement, but to mutually reinforce one another as well as the common values and principles they both stand for. The real challenge going forward will be, therefore, for the EU not to lose momentum and maintain the same level of consultation and cooperation with NATO allies (especially with the United States), once the war is finally over, and for member states to continue to invest in defense in the absence of a direct threat to their lands.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
The post Is Russia’s War in Ukraine Creating a New European Security Architecture? appeared first on Fair Observer.
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